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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
both the theories of contract and the abuse of discretion by the school board.
Broad proclamations of public policy may often place the law in rigid straits
which on the surface seem to protect a class of citizens, but upon closer
analysis subvert the very foundations of necessary free choice. The Court,
however, has, by its strict interpretation of the statute, placed free choice
in the background to ensure that local action which may be prejudicial, arbitrary, and capricious will not be used to undermine the confidence, security,
and morale of the teaching profession.
W. A. C.
ARBITRATION
APPOINTEES ON TRIPARTITE ARBITRATION BOARD ALLOWED

To

BE PARTIAL. TO

THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES W11o SELECT THmv

Defendant, a non-profit corporation organized under the Insurance Laws
of New York, entered into contracts with various partnerships of physicians,
whereby the latter supplied medical assistance to the insurer's customers.
Payment to the doctors was initially a fixed sum with an additional supplemental payment depending on criteria and standards both parties were to fix
in the future. In the event that the parties failed to arrive at these criteria,
the question was to be submitted to a tripartite arbitration board, each party
selecting an arbitrator and a third chosen by the two appointees. Subsequently,
the parties failed to agree. Defendant selected one of its Board of Directors
as its appointed arbitrator. Plaintiff moved to disqualify him on the grounds
of personal bias, interest and partiality and to have appellant substitute an
impartial arbitrator. Special Term granted the motion which was affirmed by
the Appellate Division and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.1
Held: reversed with three judges dissenting. Although a court could intervene
in an appropriate case and disqualify an arbitrator before an award has been
rendered, a member of a board of directors of a corporate party was not disqualified to act as the party's nominated arbitrator solely because of this
relationship. Tripartite arbitration is implicitly partisan in nature. In the
Matter of Astoria Medical Group, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 85, 227 N.Y.S.2d
401 (1962).
Arbitration is a method of adjudication of differences which parties, by
consent, substitute for usual processes provided by law.2 Parties to an arbitration contract are completely free to agree upon the identity of the arbitrators
and the manner in which they are chosen.3 The law recognizes the arbitration
contract of the parties, and courts will not vary its terms but will implement
1. 13 A.D.2d 288, 216 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1st Dep't 1961).
2. Cf. Cross and Brown Co. v. Nelson, 4 A.D.2d 501, 167 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1st Dep't
1957).
3. See N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 1452.
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the agreement and give it effectual enforcement. 4 Therefore, the arbitral tribunal, is a creature which is exclusively devised by the parties in their inherent
capacity to contract privately between themselves.5
Despite positive language by appellate courts about the necessity of
impartial arbitrators in tripartite arbitration agreements, it is an impossible
ideal.6 Arbitrators appointed by parties are selected usually because they are
advocates of the cause of the party appointing them.7 The Legislature of New
York has recognized the partiality of an arbitrator appointed by a party to a
contract by specifically permitting the vacating of an award of arbitration
only where the partiality is that of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral.8
The majority of the Court in the instant case held that the very reason
a partial arbitrator may be selected is that the parties actually contract for
the choice of their own arbitrator. In practice and experience, the choice of a
partial arbitrator in a tripartite arrangement is universally accepted. The choice
is given so that the party can rely on the fact that his "side" is represented
on the tribunal. The Court, in interpreting the arbitration clause of the contract, further stated that the parties did not intend that the appointees be
impartial or they would have so provided. The dissenting judges adhered to the
principle that an arbitral tribunal is "judicialized" to some degree, and the
inclusion of a non-neutral arbitrator is alien to the judicial process. In answer
to the argument of the minority opinion, Dean Sturges has written:
Arbitrators, as distinguished from judges, are not appointed by
the sovereign, are not paid by it, nor are they sworn to allegiance.
Arbitrators exercise no constitutional jurisdiction or like role in the
judicial systems-state or national. They are not generally bound to
follow the law unless the parties so prescribe and, as likely as not,
they are laymen technically unqualified (and not disposed) to exercise the office of professional judge
Merchants desire to compromise but may be too proud to do the compromising on their own. They can preserve their self respect by allowing
"arbitrators" to do it for them. The majority of the Court in the instant case
realized the necessity of each party appointing a partisan arbitrator. In effect,
a tripartite arbitration tribunal, acts not as a court whereby a legal dispute is
settled, but as a body where the parties may have their problems resolved to
everyone's satisfaction.
L. H. S.
4.
5.
6.

Cf. Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
Cf. Matter of Lipschutz, 304 N.Y. 58, 106 N.E.2d 8 (1952).
Cf. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 240 N.Y. 398, 148 N.E.

562 (1925).

7. See Phillips, A Lawyer's Approach to Commercial Arbitration, 44 Yale LJ. 31
(1934).
8. See N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511(b) (1) (i) (eft. Sept. 1, 1963).
9. Sturges, Arbitration-What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1031, 1045, 1046 (1960).

